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cohabitation in the civilian community 6; and cross-dressing 63 can be punished: under the UCMJ.
When the command intrudes upon the sexual activities of
a soldier, however, the intrusion should be as limited as
possible while serving the military purpose. This is simply
another way of stating the requirement that orders serve a
military purpose, " as the unnecessarily broad and intrusive
aspects of an order would lack a sufficient military nexus.
Tested against this standard, the required "safe-sex" order is as limited as possible while fully achieving its military
purpose. Soldiers are not quarantined, nor are they prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse. 6s They are instead
simply required to ensure that potential sexual partners are
protected and informed. Merely because the number of
willing partners may be diminished does not mean that the
order is unnecessarily intrusive. The prohibition against
adultery, carnal knowledge, and fraternization, for example,
reduce the pool of potential sexual partners without; being
overbroad or otherwise unenforceable.
Finally, the "safe-sex" order comports with the recommendations of the President's Commission on the HIV
Epidemic. The commission recommended, in part:
Adoption by the states of a criminal statute-directed
to those HIV-infected individuals who know of their
status and engage in behaviors which they know are,
according to scientific research, likely to result in
transmission of HIV-clearly setting forth those specific behaviors subject to criminal sanctions. With
regard to sexual transmission, the statute should impose on HIV-infected individuals who know of their
status specific affirmative duties to disclose their condition to sexual partners, to obtain their partner's
knowing consent, and to use precautions, punishing
only for failure to comply with these affirmative
duties. 66
62 United
63

In summary, the 'safe-sex" order has an obvious military,
nexus when the soldier's potential sexual partner is a service member, family member,, or civilian employee: An
arguable nexus is present even for "unaffiliated" civilians,
given the 'severely service discrediting imipact of unwarned
and unprotected sex in the civilian community under such
circumstances. Even if the order lacks a sufficient military,
nexus in some cases, it is sufficiently definite and related to
a military purpose to support its lawfulness in most circumstances. Because the order is narrowly drawn to achieve its
military purpose without unnecessarily intruding into private areas of conduct, it is not rendered unlawful because it
modifies sexual behavior. The "safe-sex" order, in short; isa lawful military order.,
Conclusion

-

As recent events demonstrate, the legality of the "safesex" order is not settled. Persuasive arguments against the
lawfulness of the order can surely be made in certain cases.
More sweeping arguments against the legality of all such
"safe-sex" orders will no doubt also be advanced, Despite
all of these contentions, the "safe-sex" order would constitute a lawful military order in most circumstances. Until
the appellate courts authoritatively decide this issue, how.
ever, the legality of the "safe-sex" order will surely remain
a subject of academic controversy and adversarial
contention.
Editor's note-As this article went to print, the Air Force
Court of Military Review decided the case of United States
v. Womack, ACM 26660 (A.F.C.M.R. 27 Oct. 1988) (en
banc). 'In Womack, the court affirmed the accused's conviction for violating a "safe-sex" order from his commander by
engaging in unwarned and unprotected homosexual sodomy.,

States v. Leach, 22 C.M.R. 178 (C.M.A. 1956).

United States v. Davis, 26 MJ.445 (C.M.A. 1988).
"MCM, 1984, Part IV, para. 14c(2XaXiii).
65
Compare the limited "safe-sex" order in Manning to the absolute prohibition against drinking alcohol in Roach.
"Report of the President's Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic, 24 June 1988, at 9-46. Consistent with these recommendations:
In 1987 alone, 29 bills containing criminal sanctions specifically dealing with AIDS were introduced in state'legislatures. Five states have enacted
statutes which 'criminalize certain behavior by individuals who have tested positive for Humin Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the Virus which causes
AIDS-as well as those who have AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex (ARC),
M. Schechter, AIDS: How the Disease IsBeing Criminalized, American Bar Association Criminal Justice, Section of Criminal Justice 6, 7 (Fall 1988,' vol. 3,
no. 3), (citing Draft Report of the American Bar Association Section of Criminal Justice Ad Hoc Committee on AIDS and the Criminal Justice System,
March 1988, p. 59).
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arise. Often, the clients are facing extreme financial difficul-"
ties. Although the Clients may have suspected that
At best, automobile repossession cases are vexing irrirepossession was likely for quite some time, they may nevtants for legal assistance attorneys. They are particularly
ertheless have delayed seeking an attorney's assistance in
frustrating given the circumstances in which they typically
hopes that the inqvitable would never occur. They may
8
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even have delayed seeking legal help until after the repos'
session. The longer the clients wait before seeking
assistance, the more they limit their options and the attorney's ability to obtain relief.

negotiating with the creditors. Because time is always of the
essence, it is important that the attorneys become completely familiar with the circumstances before devoting their
attention to one approach or the other.

Clients who seek legal assistance earlier in the repossession process preserve their options, which may include
preventing the repossession altogether, allowing the client
an opportunity to reclaim the vehicle after repossession, or
limiting the client's liability to the loss of the vehicle itself.
Many of the actions considered by the attorney will be
based on the provisions in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or the Code). I This article begins
with a discussion of steps that may be taken to eliminate
the need to resort to the U.C.C. Because these steps will not
always be successful, the article also examines the protective provisions of the U.C.C. and how 2 they have been
interpreted and applied by various courts.

The %rst,often overlooked, approach is simply contacting,
the creditor and requesting an extension. To be successful,
attorneys must satisfy the creditors that their clients are
credit-worthy and can cure the delinquency within a reasonable period. Otherwise responsible payment histories
and good credit ratings will assist in both respects. Extensions, which are inexpensive and painless, should never be
overlooked.

Preventing Repossession
The most typical causes of automobile repossession are
debtor ignorance and procrastination. When debtors fail to
seek legal assistance because they are unaware of their
rights with respect to secured transactions or because they
believe that nothing can be done to prevent the repossession, the attorney will indeed be able to do little following
the repossession. Hence, the attorney's first step in preventing repossession is to educate potential clients so they will
seek help. 3

eN

If the legal education campaign has been effective, the attorneys should see their clients well before repossession
occurs. At the initial meeting, the attorneys should gather
the information necessary to formulate their strategy, determine how many months the clients are behind in their
payments, and consider what actions the creditors have already taken. It is also important to 'obtain copies of
purchase and finance contracts, payment booklets, checking
and savings account statements, leave and earnings statements, and summaries of the clients' monthly expenses. The
attorney should inquire into the clients' payment histories
and determine whether the creditors have previously
threatened repossession. If time permits,
attorneys should
4
obtain their clients' credit reports .
Attorneys must also direct some attention to the vehicles.
They should determine the mechanical condition of the
cars, as well as the retail and wholesale values of the cars.
The clients should be encouraged to keep the cars clean and
mechanically sound, if possible, to protect the resale values
in case the clients are forced to sell the cars.
All of this information is essential in determining strategy and predicting the likelihood of success. For example,
the prospect of obtaining alternative financing may be discounted if the clients have grossly abused their previous
credit privileges. Conversely, if the attorney determines that
the delinquency is due merely to a temporary cashflow
problem, it may be prudent to dedicate substantial time to

C'"11

Often, obtaining an extension is simply a matter of showing the creditor that an extension is in the creditor's best
interest. Perhaps the delinquency is due to an unexpected,
nonrecurring expense. In this case, it would be foolish for,
the creditor to repossess the car and further jeopardize their
ability to collect on the loan. If, however, the client's delinquency is the result of a long term overextension of
finances, it is unlikely that the client's financial situation
will improve within a short period of time. Under these circumstances, the attorney might assist the client in
developing a written plan that shows how the client proposes to cure the delinquency. A written proposal is often more
effective than verbal assurances, because it shows that the
client has given serious consideration to the problem. Even
a plan that'stretches over six months or more may provide
the creditor with a greater return than if the creditor repossessed and resold the car. Upon resale, the creditor may not
receive the full amount of the outstanding debt, and it will
be difficult to collect the deficiency because of the client's
poor financial situation. Thus, an extension may be in the

creditor's best interest even though the client's financial position seems hopeless.
A second, less desirable option involves assisting the client in refinancing through the original or another creditor
with the goal of achieving lower payments. The attorney's
role in this process is essentially an advisory one. The attorney should discourage the client from using an easily
obtainable, high interest loan; such loans invariably worsen
the client's financial situation. Even the more competitive
loans should be avoided, if possible, as they often increase
the client's long term debt by combining lower periodic
payments with higher interest rates or longer loan terms.
Even under these circumstances, however, refinancing may
be preferable to repossession, and should be considered.
A final approach involves selling the car to a third party
and obtaining a release from the creditor. Here, too, the attorney's participation will be limited. Although the attorney
may give the client a few practical tips to increase the probability of selling the car, the attorney's main concern will be
ensuring 'that the creditor gives the client a written release
and not just an acquiescence in a third party's assumption
of the debt. The attorney may even draft a release for the
creditor's signature. Of course, without evidence of the release, selling the car may be no solution at all. Although

'Uniform Commercial Code (9th ed. 1978) [hereinafter U.C.C.]. The U.C.C. has been adopted in all states except Louisiana. J. White and R. Summers,
Uniform Commercial Code 1 (2d ed. 1980).
2 Rather than concentrate on a single jurisdiction, this article will delineate general rules. Specific cases are discussed in order to identify and exemplify
trends.
3On most military installations there are media available for this purpose. The newspaper, daily bulletins, and information papers are excellent resources.
4See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1982).
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selling the car and obtaininig the release may seem simple
enough, this approach can create additional problems, because a client who sells his only vehicle must find
transportation. Obviously, collateral consequences such as
this must be considered when adopting a given course of
action.
Post-Repossession
Sometimes, despite the attorney's best efforts or because
of client procrastination or ignorance, the creditor, will repossess the client's car. It may then appear that the damage
is complete and there is no remaining need for an attorney.
On the contrary, it is at this point that the client most
needs legal counsel. The U.C.C. contemplates as much:
In the area of rights after default, our legal system has
traditionally looked with suspicion on agreements
designed to cut down the debtor's rights and free the
secured party of his duties. . . . The default situation
offers great scope for overreaching; the suspicious attitude of the courts has been grounded in common
sense.
Because the client is very vulnerable after repossession, the
attorney's efforts on the client's behalf are critical at this
Stage. The attorney must alert the client that the bank may
sell the automobile for whatever price is easily obtained,
and that this price may not be sufficient to extinguish the
client's debt.6 If this occurs, the bank may attempt to obtain a judgment against the client for the deficiency. 7 Once
the judgment is granted, the client will have little recourse,
having already lost the car and whatever equity may have
accrued. The client's credit rating will have been damaged,
and there will be an outstanding judgment against him.
The attorney's active participation in a post-repossession
case can prevent the above scenario from occurring. Article
9 of the U.C.C. may provide the attorney not only with the
tools, but with the remedies as well. It establishes procedural protections designed to ensure that the debtor is treated
fairly. and is not saddled with an unjust deficiency ,judgment, The courts have also fashioned a forfeiture penalty to
be used in case the creditor fails in its obligation to treat the
client fairly. Skillful use of both the procedural protections
and the available remedy may protect the client from further damage.
Two important protections established by the Code are
the right to receive notice prior to sale of the collateral and
the requirement that any sale of the collateral be conducted
in a commercially reasonable manner.8 It is important that
5

these protections be enforced. Insisting on strict compliance
will either ensure'that the collateral is not sold for a grossly
inadequate price or, as discussed later, prevent the creditor
from asserting a large deficiency judgment against the debtor. The rights to receive notice prior to sale and to a
commercially reasonable sale of the collateral are established in § 9-504(a):
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made by way of one or
more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a
unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on
any terms but every aspect of the disposition including
the method, manner, time, place, and terms must be
commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a
type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale
or reasonable notification of the time after which any
private sale or other intended disposition is to be made
shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he
has not signed after default a statement renouncing or
modifying his right to notification of sale. 9
Note that § 9-504(3) establishes two exceptions to the
debtor's right to receive notice prior to sale or other disposition. The first is of no concern in automobile possession
cases because an automobile is not perishable and does not
speedily decline in value. The second exception, which applies only when there is a recognized market for the
collateral, is equally inapplicable given the case law. It is
settled that there exists no "recognized market" for used
automobiles. 10 Generally, a recognized market is one in
which the price of goods does not depend on individual differences and is essentially nonnegotiable. 11 In contrast, the
price of a used car will depend on several factors, including
"make, style, horsepower, age, and condition." 12Thus, neither of the exceptions to the notice requirement apply in
automobile repossession cases.
The requirement that notice be reasonable has provided
the impetus for much litigation. The dispute most often
arises when the debtor has not actually received notice, although the creditors may have made some attempt at actual
notification. 'The Code does not define "reasonable" notification, although the comments to § 9-504 provide some
insight:
"Reasonable notification" is not defined in this Article;
at a minimum it must be sent in such time that persons
entitled to receive it will have sufficient time to take

U.C.C. § 9-501 (Comment 4) (9th ed' 1978).
One study indicates that the average resale price of repossessed cars is only 52% of the retail value. See J. White and R. Summers, supra note 1, at 26-9.

6

7 The creditor has the right to apply the proceeds of sale to the following:
(a) The reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured
party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under which the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interest in the collateral if written notification of demand therefore is received
before distribution of the proceeds is completed.
U.C.C. § 9-504(l) (1978). The debtor is liable for any deficiency. U.C.C. § 9-504 (1978).
5

U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1918).-

1

° See J. White and R. Summers, supra note I, at 26-10.
1Id.
Nelson v. Monarch, 452 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).

12
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appropriate steps to protect their interests by taking
part in the sale or other disposition if they so desire. 13

/,,a

Significantly, there is no provision guaranteeing that the
debtor actually receive notice. The Code simply requires
that notice be "sent." "Sending" notification requires only
that the creditor dispatch the notice in a manner that reasonably ensures receipt, such as depositing a properly
stamped and addressed letter in the mail. 14
There are, nevertheless, circumstances under Which a
court sympathetic to the debtor may view the failure of actual receipt as important. In Mallicoat v.Volunteer Finance
& Loan Corp.,." the creditor repossessed an automobile and
sent notice by registered mail of its intent to sell the vehicle.
When the letter was returned unclaimed, the creditor proceeded to sell the vehicle and obtain a deficiency judgment
against the debtor. 16 On appeal, the court held that the
creditor had not given reasonable notice, finding that the
creditor should have made a further attempt to ensure actual receipt of notice, as the debtor and creditor were in the
same city, the creditor knew where the debtor and his parents lived, and the creditor knew that the debtor had not
actually received the letter of notification.' 7
Other courts have acknowledged that actual receipt is irrelevant under the Code, and then gone to great lengths to
find insufficient notice. In Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Metcalfe," a Kentucky case, the creditor sent notice to codebtors who were husband and wife. Although the financing contract was signed individually by both husband and
wife, the creditor sent the single repossession notice to "Mr.
and Mrs. Herbert H. Metcalfe." The Court held that this
notice was insufficient as to the wife, finding that notice to
one spouse is not automatically imputed to the other. 19
Thus, while the Code requires that the creditor do very little to meet the notice requirement, some courts have held
the creditor to a stricter burden.
An attorney who is successful in ensuring notice prior to
sale of the collateral will be in a much better position to influence the price at which the collateral sells. One method
of ensuring notice is for the attorney to contact the creditor
immediately after the first client interview, inform the creditor of the attorney's representation, and request that all
notices and documents be sent directly to the attorney.
Once notice is given, the attorney will be able to monitor
the method of sale to ensure that the collateral brings a fair

price If, for example, the creditor plans to sell the collateral at a public auction, the attorney, may wish to inquire into
the methods of advertising and be present at the auction. If
the attorney finds the planned method of sale insufficient,
the attorney should be certain to register an objection.
These objections should be made even if the sale could be
considered commercially reasonable under U.C.C. standards. Often, the creditor will heed those objections in
orderm to avoid future litigation.
The second important protection provided by § 9-504(3)
is the requirement that the creditor sell or dispose of the
collateral in a "commercially reasonable" manner. Here
again, the Code provides fittlie guidance:
If the secured party either sells the collateral in the
usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if
he sells at the price current in such market at the time
of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity
with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in
the type of property sold he has sold in a commercially
reasonable manner.2 0
Better guidance with respect to what type of sale will be
considered commercially reasonable is usually provided by
the courts. One court, however, has defined a commercially
reasonable sale as one that is in accordance with "prevailing trade practices among reputable business and
commercial enterprises engaged in the same or similar business." 21 Given the vagueness of the terms used, this
definition is only moderately helpful, at best. Other courts
have provided more definitive guidance.
In Trimbol v. Sanitol of Memphis, Inc.,2 2 the court gave
a short but helpful discussion of commercial reasonableness. The opinion highlighted six factors that should be
considered in determining whether a sale is commercially
reasonable: the type of collateral involved, the condition of
the collateral, the number of bids solicited, the time and
place of sale, the purchase price or terms of sale, and any
special circumstances. 23
The attorney should use the Trimbol factors in analyzing
a particular fact situation. The first two factors, type and
condition of the vehicle, focus on the price at which a reasonable sales representative would expect to sell the
collateral. If the attorney's analysis shows that the car is a
rusty, old, foreign import that needs repair, the price expectation should be low. The third and fourth factors, time and

'3 U.C.C. § 9-504 (Comment 5) (1978).
4
1

U.C.C. § 1-201 (38) (1978).

1"415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).
6

1id. at 349.

17 1d. at 350. Later Tennessee opinions have relied on Mallicoat to take a functional approach to the notice requirement, focusing their inquiry on whether
the creditor's actions have actually informed the debtor of the Impending disposition. For example, in International Harvester Credit v. Ingram, the court
stated:
We think the provision for notice in connection with a sale is intended to afford the debtor a reasonable opportunity (1) to avoid a sale altogether by
discharging the debt and redeeming the collateral or (2) in case of sale, to see that the collateral brings a fair price. A notice that does not afford him
this reasonable opportunity is not reasonable notification and a sale under it is not commercially reasonable.
619 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance and Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966)).

"s663 S.W.2d 957 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
1 Id.

20 U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1978).
21 See, eg., Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).
22723 S.W.2d 633 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
23 Id. at 642 (citing In re Four Star Music Co., 2 B.R. 454 (M.D. Tenn. 1979)).
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place of sale and'number of bids solicited, focus on the ef-

forts put into the sale based on the price expectations

will provide the attorney with a rough standard32 by which to
measure the sufficiency of the price received."

determined by the first two factors. If the automobile was
an extremely popular model with low mileage, it would be
unreasonable for the creditor to sell the 'automobile to the
first bidder, without negotiation. The sixth factor, referred
to as "special circumstances" by the Trimbol court, is simply a catch-all phrase for any other relevant equitable
circumstances. For example, in Trimbol, the defaulting
debtor contacted potential purchasers and suggested that
the collateral would be entangled in lawsuits, 'thereby dis-

Most handbooks will list both the wholesale and retail
value of the automobile. The retail value will always be
higher than the wholesale value. It is therefore necessary to
determine which market is considered commercially reasonable. The debtor's attorney, of course, should argue that
a sale in a wholesale market is commercially unreasonable.
Unfortunately, this argument has not been very successful
in recent times. In fall v.Owen State Bank, 13for example,
the court stated:

couraging those purchasers. 24 Thus, the Trimbol factors

provide for a pragmatic approach to the issue of commercial reasonableness.

The price factor listed in Trimbol is really not a factor at
all. Instead, it is the goal toward which all other factors are
geared." Despite the Code drafter's intentions to the con-

trary, 26 the price for which the collateral sells is the
overriding consideration. Indeed, the issue of commercial
reasonableness will never arise unless the collateral sells for

an unsatisfactory price. Therefore, an insufficient price
should not be a factor in determining commercial
reasonableness. Instead, the debtor's attorney should treat a
low price as the basis for a presumption of commercial
unreasonableness.
This approach is justified by case law. While the courts
may state that price is not everything, they invariably treat
price as though it were the determining factor.' In Womack
v. First State Bank, 27 the court stated: "While a low price is
not conclusive proof that a sale has not been commercially
reasonable, a large discrepancy between sales price and fair
market value 'signals a need for close scrutiny." "28 In another case, Smith v. Daniels,29the court stated: "Although
the Code is careful to point out that a creditor's failure does
not in and of itself make a sale commercially unreasonable,
a sufficient resale price is the logical focus of the protection
given debtors by these sections." 30 It seems obvious, then,
that a low resale price gives the attorney a basis upon which
to make a good faith argument that the sale was commercially unreasonable.
Two points of reference to be used in arguing that the
sale price was commercially unreasonable are the fair market value of the vehicle and the market chosen by the
creditor (wholesale or retail). The fair market value of an
automobile can easily be determined by reference to the
Red Book. 31Although the Red Book value is not the sole
standard by which to analyze a resale, "even when such
handbooks are only considered a guide to valuation they
24

It is certainly true that a retail sale of goods will in
most cases command a much higher price. However, a
retail sale will usually generate considerably more expense, such as reconditioning expenses, advertising
expenses and sale commissions, insurance costs, etc.,
and usually will take much longer to consummate.
This in turn may result in higher storage expenses and
a higher interest accrual under the original obligation.
Therefore, a sale to a dealer on the wholesale market,
will probably be the more reasonable approach in most
cases. 14

If the facts are such that a retail sale will generate more
expense, Hall should allow creditors to use the wholesale
market. In most automobile repossession cases, however,
these expenses will not be present. This is especially true if
the creditor is a bank, in which case the attorney should insist that some attempt be made to sell the vehicle on the
retail market. This would only require that the vehicle be
parked in the bank parking lot with a "For Sale" sign. It
would not require reconditioning, advertising, commissions,
or storage expense. Hence, Hall does not automatically preclude sale in the retail market.
Section 9-507 establishes the debtor's remedy where the
creditor violates the protections outlined in Article 9. It
provides for damages and establishes a minimal amount of
recovery. 11 This remedy will normally not be very advantageous, as the debtor's obligation on the original loan will
probably exceed provable damages. The more effective remedy in response to a creditor's violation of the U.C.C. is the
forfeiture of the deficiency judgment. This "remedy" for the
debtor also acts as a penalty against the creditor. It is also
more effective in creating an incentive for creditors to provide the 'Code protections.
Not all jurisdictions recognize the forfeiture penalty.
Some hold that the creditor's failure merely creates a rebuttable presumption that the collateral would have garnished

ld. at 640.

25See J. White and R. Summers, supra note I, at 26-11.
26
1

"The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of
itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner." U.C.C. § 9-507(2).
27 728 S.W.2d 194 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).
28Id. at 197.
29 634 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. Ct..App. 1982).
3

od. at 278.

31 National Market Reports, Inc., Red Book (January 1988).
32j.

White and R. Summers, supra note 1, at 26-11.

33 370 N.E.2d 918 (Ind, Ct. App. 1977).

34 d at 930.
35 "If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten percent of
the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus ten percent of the cash price." U.C.C. § 9-507(1).

12
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an amount equal to the debt had the creditor followed
U.C.C. procedures. 36 In those jurisdictions, the creditor
has the burden of proving that the collateral's resale price
was unaffected by the failure to follow U.C.C. procedure.
Once this is accomplished, the creditor is entitled to a deficiency judgment.
The movement to accept the "forfeiture penalty" concept
as the majority rule is best illustrated by a series of cases
decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court. The first, Norton
v. National Bank of Commerce, 31involved the typical situation. The bank repossessed an automobile and, without
notice to the debtor, sold it at a private sale. 3 The proceeds were insufficient to cover the debt and the bank
therefore sued for a deficiency judgment. 3 9 The debtor argued that the bank's failure to give notice barred it from
collecting a deficiency judgment. 40 The court agreed that
the bank had acted improperly but nevertheless refused to
accept the debtor's argument. Instead, the court established
a compromise:
We think the just solution is to indulge the presumption in the first instance that the collateral was worth
at least the amount of the debt, thereby shifting to the
creditor the burden of proving the amount that should
reasonably have been4 obtained through a sale conducted according to law . '
The rule in Norton seems fair to both the debtor and creditor. The court's approach cautiously accepted the Code
drafters' notion that creditors are often tempted to take advantage of defaulting debtors. 42 Additionally, the court
rejected the idea that creditors' actions are always-so repugnant that they bar a deficiency judgment. The court,
therefore, acknowledged that neither the creditor nor the
debtor is completely lacking in fault. After all, the debtor's
obligation should not be ignored simply because the creditor has acted erroneously. To do so would unjustly enrich
the debtor. This is not to suggest that the court should ignore possible overreaching by creditors.. By purposefully or
accidentally failing to follow Code procedures, the creditor
may have deprived the debtor of the full value of the automobile. The court's shifting of the burden to the creditor
provides adequate protection of both parties' interests.
In Rhodes v. Oaklawn Bank,4 3 however, the Arkansas
Supreme Court provided increased protection for debtors.
In that case, :the bank repossessed restaurant equipment
from a defaulting debtor. 44 Later, the bank sold the equipment without notifying the debtor. 4 On appeal from the
grant of a deficiency judgment, the court held that because

the bank did not give notice, it was not "entitled" to a judgment." Curiously, the court did not remand the case so
that the bank could attempt to meet the Norton standard.
As a result, the decision could be interpreted in two ways.
First, that as a matter of law, a creditor that fails to provide
notice can never meet the Norton standard. A second, more
expansive reading of the decision would lead to the conclusion that Norton was simply overruled and that a failure to
comply with the U.C.C. in any respect caused the creditor
to forfeit the deficiency.
This issue was decided in First State Bank of Morritton v.
Hallett,47 where the bank repossessed the debtor's car and
sold it without notice. 48 As if intending to put the matter
finally to rest, the court stated that "the rule and requirement are simple. If the secured creditor wishes a deficiency
judgment he must obey the law. If he does not obey the
law, he may not have his deficiency judgment." 4 9
The language chosen by the court was sufficiently expansive not only to overrule the Norton case, but also to
conclude that, at least in Arkansas, any violation of the Article 9 protections is enough to preclude a deficiency
judgment.
As representative of the majority rule, Hallett appears to
be an outgrowth of sympathy for defaulting debtors. Most
cases, after all, involve a relatively large institutional creditor against a nearly destitute debtor. It is no wonder, then,
that Hallett represents the majority. It is also clear that
sympathy may be the attorney's best weapon in automobile
repossession cases. In analyzing the equities of the forfeiture penalty, there can be no other conclusion than that it is
an attempt to give debtors a break.
Conclusion
There are many practical and legal approaches to automobile repossession cases. None of these approaches is very
successful, however, unless the problem is brought to an attorney's attention in a timely manner. This merely states
the obvious. Yet, one would think that the proposition is
terribly complex, given the frequency with which clients
seek help after repossessions. Recognizing and attempting
to prevent client procrastination, therefore, is the first step
for any attorney involved in an automobile repossession
case.
Once this step is taken, the attorney can begin to apply
practical solutions in an effort to prevent the repossession.
Many suggestions, such as an extension or refinancing, do

36

See, ag., J. White and R. Summers, supra note 1, at 26-15.
37 398 S.W.2d 538 (Ark. 1966).
3
Id. at 539.
39Id.
40

Id.

41 Id. at 542.
42

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

43 648 S.W.2d 470 (Ark. 1983).
44Id
41 ld at 471.
4Id.

at 472.

47722 S.W.2d 555 (Ark, 1987).
48
49

d.
Id. at 557 (quoting Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972)).
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not necessarily require the services of an attorney. The attorney's participation, however, will increase the
probability of preventing repossession.
Even where the attorney isunsuccessful at preventing repossession, it is better for an attorney to become involved
early in the process. Once the repossession becomes a reality, the attorney is in a better position to enforce the
protective provisions of the U.C.C. These include the right
to notice prior to sale and the right to insist that the creditor resell the collateral in a commercially reasonable

manner. With. respect to resale, the attorney should determine whether the applicable jurisdiction recognizes the

forfeiture penalty. Although the forfeiture penalty creates a
windfall for the debtor, it is still the most effective means of
ensuring that the debtor is not burdened with a large deficiency judgment. In many instances, in fact, preventing or
reducing the deficiency judgment, will be the only positive
aspect of an otherwise totally frustrating experience.
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DAD Notes
The Demise of the Burton Demand Prong
In United States v. McCallister' the Court of Military
Appeals shot down the "demand prong" of United States v.
Burton 2 as a per se violation of the accused's right to
speedy trial. The court revisited the rationale of Burton's
"demand prong" and explained that Rule for Courts-Martial 707, 3 along with the. Burton 90-day rule and the fourpart sixth amendment standard set forth in Barker v.
Wingo, 4 adequately protect an accused's right to speedy trial. Has this ruling made a demand for speedy trial a lifeless
defense request?
In Barker, the United States Supreme Court held that,
due to the relative nature of the speedy trial right, courts
should approach each claim of denial of speedy trial on an
ad hoc basis. To provide guidance, the Court set out a
broad constitutional standard. The Court explained that the
lower courts should balance four factors to determine if an
accused had been denied the right to speedy trial: 1) the
length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the accused's assertion of his right; and 4) the prejudice to the
defendant caused by the delay.
In McCallister,the appellant was found guilty of absence
without leave and wrongful appropriation. Pursuant to the
demand prong of Burton, appellant made an oral demand
for speedy trial two days after being placed in pretrial confinement. Two days later, he made a written demand. The

government did not specifically respond to these demands
and waited a: while before moving forward with a view toward trial. Ten days after .the written demand, the
government appointed an investigating officer under article
32.6 At trial, appellant maintained that the government
had not responded to his demands. Appellant contended
that the failure to respond deprived him of his right to a
speedy trial and therefore required dismissal of the wrongful appropriation-specification.
The Army. Court of Military Review had stated that it
did not believe the Burton demand rule was intended to result in automatic dismissal where the accused's rights had
not been violated by the delay. 7 To determine whether appellant's right to speedy trial had in fact been prejudiced by
the government's failure to respond to appellant's demands,
the Army court analyzed the government's failure to respond to appellant's demands under the sixth amendment
standards of Barker in conjunction with the Burton demand
rule, and held that the government's appointment of an investigating officer was sufficient response to appellant's
demands and was evidence of the government's diligence in
disposing of the case.
The Court of Military Appeals eliminated "sufficiency of
the government's response" from the analysis and specifically overruled the "demand prong" of Burton. The court
stated that Burton was decided before the President

'27 M.J. 138 (C.M.A. 1988).
244 C.M.R. 166 (C.M.A. 1971).
3 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, Rules for Courts-Martial 707 [hereinafter R.C.M.].

4407 U.S. 512 (1972).

C

'Id. at 530.
6Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 932 (1982).
724 Mj.881 (A.C.M.R. 1988).
'Id. at 892.
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promulgated R.C.M. 707 to provide guidelines for enforcing the right to speedy trial. Now R.C.M. 707 provides
specific guidelines that ensure an accused will be brought to
trial within 120 days'of restraint or preferral of charges, or
within 90 days of confinement. Any claim of denial of sixth
amendment speedy trial is still examined' under the Barker
analysis. Therefore, "any purpose sought to be served originally by the 'demand prong' of Burton is now fully met by
the three sets of protections mentioned." 9
In light of McCallister there are now four standards for
determining speedy trial: 1) the 120-day standard of
R.C.M. 707(a); 2) the 90-day standard of R.C.M. 707(d); 3)
the Burton 90-day rule; 10 and 4) the sixth amendment
guarantee. An accused's unanswered demand for speedy trial alone per se is no longer grounds for dismissal, but such a
demand is still an important element to consider when litigating an accused's claim of denial. Therefore an accused
should still make demands for speedy trial and trial defense
counsel should ensure the "demand prong" lives beyond its
Burton demise. CPT Patricia D. White,
Murphy's Law: The Rating Chain-Still an Issue
Regarding Challenges of Court Members?
In United States v. Murphy, " the Court of Military Appeals struck down a per se rule of disqualification for a
,panel member who wrote or endorsed the efficiency reports
of a junior member. Although the court in Murphy I eliminates the mere presence of a rating relationship among
members as an automatic challenge for cause, defense counsel at trial may nonetheless try to establish that such a
relationship presents actual grounds for challenge. Furthermore, counsel in the field should continue in their endeavor
to demonstrate that these rating relationships are improper
per se in all cases by developing a record that will support a
general rule challenging the notion that these relationships
are essentially benign.
To fully understand the significance of the decision in
Murphy I, counsel should be aware of what the Court of
Military Appeals did not decide. The court did not sanction

the appointment of members who stand in rating relationships with one another. The court simply found that the
Air Force Court of Military Review had not justified the
imposition of an absolute rule of disqualification.
The accused, Staff Sergeant Murphy, had entered guilty
pleas to sodomy of a child under 16 years of age, assault,
and multiple allegations of indecent acts with a child under
16 years of age. 12 The president of the panel and another
senior colonel wrote or endorsed the efficiency reports of
two other court-martial members. As a result of their sincere manifestations of impartiality,' the military judge
denied the asserted challenges for cause against both senior

officers. 13
In their initial decision 14 and on reconsideration," the
Air Force court concluded that the mere presence of such a
direct supervisory relationship created "an appearance of
evil." " The sole rehson compelling the establishment of a
per se rule was that the system of justice must appear to be
fair to disinterested observers. '7 The Air Force court did
not appear to explore any motives that would suggest an
impermissible use of these relationships. " The court only
seems to note that those members involved would not attempt to offer undue influence. Finally, the court did not
explain why the rule of disqualification only operated
against the senior members of the panel. 9
Thus, Murphy If did not present a factually sufficient
foundation upon which to base a substantial change in policy. 20 In fact, in Murphy III, the Air Force court invited the
Court of Military Appeals to dispute their conclusions. 2
The incorrect application of precedent, the lack of any factual predicate, and the inflexibility of a per se rule
regardless of military exigencies rendered the disposition of
Murphy II and III a foregone conclusion.
It is in this light that the decision of the Court of Military Appeals should be viewed. Murphy I narrowly decided
the issue by holding that United States v. Harris22 does not
compel a per se rule of disqualification and that the appropriate factual predicate was not presented to support such
an absolute prohibition. Murphy I did not, however, find
that superior-subordinate relationships were not subject to

9Mccallister, 27 M.J. 138, 140-41.

10 Although the court's opinion implies that R.C.M. 707(d) fully incorporates the Burton 90-day rule, not all periods of exclusions applicable to R.C.M.
707(d) are deductible under Burton. Therefore, it is possible to have a Burton violation despite compliance with R.C.M. 707(d). See I-C.M. 707(d) analysis.
"26 M.J. 454 (C.M.A. 1988) [hereinafter Murphy 1).
12 United States v. Murphy, 23 Mi. 690, 691 (A.F.C.M.R. 1986) [hereinafter Murphy 1I].
13'd.
14Id.
Is United States v. Murphy, 23 MJ. 764, 765 (A.F.C.M.R. 1986) (on reconsideration) [hereinafter Murphy 111].
16Id.
171d. In analyzing the appearance of impropriety, the Air Force court relied extensively on United States v. Harris, 13 MJ. 288 (C.M.A. 1982). To the
extent that Harris relied upon other factors beyond the mere existence of a rating relationship, the Air Force court was incorrect in finding that prior
precedent compelled a per se rule of disqualification. Murphy I, 26 M.J. at 456.
16There were no apparent allegations that the convening authority was attempting to orchestrate the outcome by exerting influence through these rating
schemes. Nor did the court mention the presence of opinionated senior members who would attempt to influence attitudes of those junior in rank. Finally,
there was no discussion demonstrating that these junior officers felt intimidated or had been adversely rated for past court-martial participation or any other
military justice matters.
' 9 United States v. Garcia, 26 M.J. 844, 846 n.I (A.C.M.R. 1988).
20 Furthermore, Murphy 11 failed to make reference to any allegations of impropriety that would overcome the presumption that officers or enlisted members
would properly exercise their duties.
21 "We are aware that a higher appellate court might well disagree with our conclusion and the reasoning supporting it. We welcome their guidance." Murphy IlI, 23 MJ.at 765.
22 13 M.J. 288.
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abuse. Judge Cox, writing for the majority, cautioned that
"convening authorities should avoid placing superior-subordinate combinations on courts-martial to the extent
practicable." " Although tot-a statement of condemnation,
such a warning recognizes that these relationships between
superior-subordinates may create real conflicts.
The Army Court of Military Review has also hcknowledged the sensitive nature of rating relationships between
panel members. Although declining to find such a relationship per se improper, the Army court denominated these
associations as "a matter of concern." 2 4 Furthermore; the
Army court leaves open the possibility that a proper "overriding social or judicial concern" could support the
imposition of a general prophylactic rule to guard against
abuses arising from superior-subordinate rating relationships among members. 2 However, the court clearly implies
that the factual basis for a general rule does not currently
exist.,
Nevertheless, the rating relationship may present a problem in a' particular case, and should therefore be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis. More importantly, counsel should
continue to search for the appropriate factual basis that
would support a general rule of disqualification instead of
expending resources in a case-by-case fashion. Even though
the Army court seems disposed to consider a factually sufficient basis for such a general rule, the most powerful source
of encouragement comes from the statements by Judge Cox
regarding the absehce of documentation supporting any allegation of intimidation through the use of efficiency reports
or the downgrading of a report as a result of that member's
participation in the court-martial process.' Quite simply,
Judge Cox felt that defense counsel at all levels have failed
to present a record wherein the Court of Military Appeals
could act in such an obviously sensitive area. The court will
not infer 'bias in matters of officer integrity because the
court must deal in, facts, not innuendo.
While a per se rule of disqualification without any supporting factual predicate may not be warranted, an
assumption that rating schemes can never be used or perceived to influence trial outcomes is unsound. Therefore,
defense counsel should not relent merely because trial counsel contends that Murphy I ends the discussion. The express
language of article 37(b) 26 acknowledges the very real existence of a problem and proscribes the use of efficiency
23 Murphy

reports to influence the result in a court-martial. Unfortunately, article 37(b) is only effective against overt attempts
to exercise influence, and can only serve as a moral guidepost against surreptitious attempts to undermine the
deliberative process. ;7 Even assuming that superior officers
have refrained and will continue to refrain from exerting
any undue influence,"2 another problem remains in that the
perceptions held by the rated member may affect the deliberative process. 29 Whether or not the superior member
intentionally exerts influence, the junior member may feel
inhibited in the free exercise of judgement. 30 , As was stated
by Judge Ferguson: "The lifeblood of any officer's career is
his efficiency report." 3' Judge Ferguson noted that advocacy of matters in behalf of an accused could directly
-jeopardize an officer's career. "These are not fantasies.
They
32
are the very real and hard facts of military life."
Counsel in the field need to be prepared to explore and
exhaust the limits of these rating relationships. Murphy I
and United States v. Garcia,3 do stand for the proposition
that extensive voir dire on this subject is necessary. Counsel
should look for strongly held beliefs of rating members.
Also, the reputation of the rater in matters of military justice is important. Consideration should also be given to
statements and intentions of the convening authority with
regard to particular types of offenses. Although probably
not intended to influence the court-martial process the stated desire of a general officer to deal severely with drug
offenders may develop its own inertia and transmit harsh
penalties through the inherently conductive features of superior-subordinate rating schemes. This problem becomes
more acute'whenever the convening authority selects raters
that are people that he knows personally.
Counsel should also inquire into the past efficiency reports of rated members to ascertain whether they believe
they have ever been adversely rated as a result of their participation in a court-martial. Initially, counsel should
identify those members who have been involved in previous
court-martial actions either as members or witnesses. Counsel may then want to ascertain on the record whether any
member received a rating 'which in their individual opinion
was less than deserved. Individual voir dire should then follow up on this line of questioning by asking whether there
is any relationship between the court-martial service and
the low rating, and if there is, what affect will that have on
the member. 4 Finally, counsel may also desire to ask
whether any other member of the panel believes that the

1, 26 M.I. at 456 n.*.

24 Garcia,26 M.J. at 845; United States v. Eberhardt, 24 M.J. 944, 946 (A.C.M.
25 Garcia, 26 M.I. 845.
26Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1982) [hereinafter
27 In United States v. Hubbard, 43 C.M.R. 322, 327 (C.M.A. 197 1) (Ferguson, J., dissenting), it was noted that prosecutions for a violation of UCMJ art. 37
are not common and "the only method of eliminating evil is by "exorcising its foundation."
25 The Army Court of Military Review has recognized that a rater may attempt to influence a rated individual." Eberhardt, 24 M.J. at 947.
29
1d (The court acknowledges that a rated officer may be influenced simply by the presence of his rater on the same panel.).
3oIn United States v. Deain, 17 C.M.R. 44,55 (C.M.A. 1954) (Latimer, J.,
concurring) (wherein it was error to allow the president of the court to rate the
member participants solely on the basis of their judicial duties), it was noted that junior officers in the presence of their rater may not possess the same
freedom of expression and "in the background would be the desire to accomplish the task to the satisfaction of a reporting officer."
3 Hubbard, 43 C.M.R. at 325.
32
1d Although Hubbard involved a rating relationship between trial counsel and defense counsel, the logic compelling Judge Ferguson's remarks is equally
applicable to the dynamics between members in their deliberative process.
"326 M.J. 844.
34
Again, any matters of officer integrity are bound to be sensitive. Counsel should be sure of their own instincts and pretrial research when questioning
about highly personal matters.
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;disclosed rating relationship may effect the deliberations of
the panel or if the members are -aware of any rating .relationships that have affected court-martial practice in the
past. Counsel should also determine whether each member
would feel more comfortable if there were no superior-subordinate relationships between members of the same rating
chain.
All of the above questions involve considerations of command influence. Therefore, counsel should use their
ingenuity in fashioning other inquiries that can develop the
subtleties in command and control hierarchies. In the vast
majority of inquiries, the results will probably be negative.
Nonetheless, only when the appellate courts are presented
with a proper record, will they be in a position to recognize
the value of an absolute rule of disqualification or the error
in denying a particular challenge for cause. 3 Clearly, this
is a situation where the appearance of impropriety must be
proved because of the very important competing interests
involving military integrity. However, as can be demonstrated by counsel in the field, the presence of rating
relationships is an unnecessary strain on the appearance of
fairness in court-martial practice. Trial defense counsel
must continue their vigilance and efforts to demonstrate
that if something can go wrong, it will. Or maybe, it already has. Captain Ralph L. Gonzalez.
The Providence Inquiry and Rule for Courts-Martial
1001(b)(4)

'

In United States v. Holt3 6 the Court of Military Appeals
upheld the decision of the Army Court of Military Review," and ruled that the testimony of an accused at the
providence hearing may constitute a proper matter in aggravation during the sentencing phase of trial. The court
determined, "this [providence] testimony should be admissible as an admission by the accused to aggravating
circumstances" surrounding the offense. 8
The Holt decision could initially be incorrectly viewed as
expanding the scope of aggravation evidence which is admissible, as directly relating to the charged offense in
,sentencing, to the entire providence inquiry. 3 9 Indeed, the
court found that such testimony elicited during the providence inquiry, at a trial with members, could be introduced
to members by "either a properly authenticated transcript
or by the testimony of a court reporter or other person who
heard what the accused said during the providence inquiry." 40 A closer examination of Holt, however, reveals
that the court has not disturbed its precedent concerning
what constitutes properly admissible evidence as being "directly related" to an offense of which the accused has been
found guilty, under Rule for Courts-Martial 1001(b)(4).

In Holt, the accused pled guilty to provoking speech and
wrongful distribution of methamphetamine. During the
providence inquiry on the drug offense, the accused testified
he was asked by a Criminal Investigation Command (CID)
registered source to obtain some drugs. The accused told
the'registered source that he would have to locate his roommate to obtain the drugs. The accused told the military
judge that he found his roommate asleep in another soldier's room. Unable to arouse his roommate, the accused
asked and obtained information from the other soldier on
the location of the drug source. During the sentencing
phase of trial, a CID special agent testified for the defense
as to the accused's cooperation in the investigation. On
cross-examination, the agent related that the accused, in a
sworn statement, identified his roommate as the source of
information on where the drugs could be obtained. In his
argument on sentence, trial counsel highlighted this variance to the accused's sworn testimony during the
providence inquiry, implying the accused was dishonest either in his sworn statement to CID or in his testimony at
trial. Defense counsel did not object to this cross-examination or argument of trial counsel.
On appeal, Sergeant Holt urged that the trial counsel's
use of material from the providence inquiry violated his
privilege against self-incrimination. 4' In addressing this allegation of error, the Court of Military Appeals refused to
rule that an accused's testimony during a providence inquiry was per se inadmissible during the sentencing phase of
trial. Specifically, the court found that an accused is on notice that such testimony can be used against him for
findings and sentencing if the testimony is "directly related"
to the offenses to which he has pled guilty. 42 If the military
judge's inquiry elicits uncharged misconduct not closely related to the offense to which the accused has pled guilty,
the consideration of such uncharged misconduct would not
be foreseeable by the accused. Thus, "the waiver of article
31, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831, rights and the privilege against
self-incrimination involved in entering pleas of guilty would
not extend to this uncharged misconduct." 43 The court
found such uncharged misconduct, upon defense objection,
should not be considered in sentencing." In Holt the defense counsel did not object to trial counsel's argument on
sentencing. The court determined that trial counsel's use of
uncharged misconduct from the providence inquiry did not
constitute plain error. 4
Trial defense counsel should be wary of an aggressive interpretation of Holt by trial counsel to justify the
introduction of evidence of uncharged misconduct inadmissible under R.C.M. 1001(b)(4). Defense counsel should
object to the admission of such evidence as violative of the
Rules for Courts-Martial and the accused's UCMJ art. 31

"Garcia, 26 M.J. at 845.
36United States v. Holt, 27 M.J. 57 (C.M.A. 1988).
37United States v. Holt, 22 M.J. 553 (A.C.M.R. 1986).
3

Holt, 27 M.J. at 60.

39See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, Rule for Conts-Martial 1001(bX4) [hereinafter R.C.M.].

40 Holt, 27 M.J. at 61.
41 Id. at 58.
(/t%

42

Id at 59.

4 Id- at 60.
44d.

41 Id- at 61.
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rights.46 Defense counsel should also require trial counsel
to specify the theory of admissibility of such uncharged
misconduct under R.C.M. 1001(b)(4). 41 Further, defense

counsel should request specific findings from the military
judge when ruling on the objection. Captain Jeffrey J.
Fleming.

46In a similar case, but where defense counsel did interpose an objection to consideration of uncharged misconduct elicited from the accused in the providence inquiry, the Court of Military Appeals set aside the decision of the Army court and remanded the case for further review in light of Holt. See United
States v. Whitt, U.S.C.M.A. Dkt. No. 57,576/AR (C.M.A. 29 Sept. 1988) (order).

STSee Gonzalez, A Defense Perspective of UnchargedMisconduct Under R.C.M. 1001(b)(4): What is Directly Related to an Offense, The Army Lawyer, Sept.
1988, at 37 (an excellent analysis of R.C.M. 1001(bX4) for use by trial defense counsel).

Government Appellate Division Note
Review of Courts-Martial by the Supreme Court of the United States-Miles to Go Before We Sleep
Captain Patrick J.Cunningham*
Individual Mobilization Augmentee, Government Appellate Division
"General and special courts-martial resemble judicial proceedings..
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Supreme Court in Middendorf v. Henry. I
"[C]ourts-Martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law."
2
Justice Douglas, writing for the Supreme Court in O'Callahan v. 'Parker

Introduction
As those of us who are close to the military justice system know, "military justice" has undergone sweeping
reform since the Supreme Court announced its decision in
O'Callahan.3 In 1983 Congress took a dramatic step in
providing reform by authorizing direct review of Court of
Military Appeals' decisions by the Supreme Court on writ
of certiorari.4 Congress provided this review in order to reduce the burden on soldiers attempting to reach the
Supreme Court by collateral attack of their convictions, and
to provide the government a vehicle to obtain review of decisions of the Court of Military Appeals. 5
Our system in the military is now open to scrutiny before
the high court on a routine basis. The press, the litigants,
and the Supreme Court will review every feature of the military justice system. As practitioners, we must approach
and prepare every court-martial as if it will receive Supreme

Court review. In United States v. Goodson 6 the Court reviewed a BCD special court-martial involving a handful of
drugs. With this in mind, many issues of constitutional proportion loom ahead, and this article will highlight some of
those issues.
Justice Rehnquist declined to provide a ringing endorsement of the fair-mindedness of the military justice system in
Solorio Y United States. ? Rather, his holding was based on
"the dearth of historical support for the O'Callahan holding," and the "confusion wrought by" that holding. 8 The
dissenting justices made clear that they will closely scrutinize the system's procedural safeguards and results because,
in their view, the military justice system intentionally withholds constitutional protections, is governed by unlawful
command influence, and needs still more legislative
reform. 9

*The author gratefully acknowledges the many talented authors of government briefs in the Government Appellate Division who aided in the preparation of
this article.
1425 U.S. 25, 31 (1976).
2395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).

3See infra notes 89 through 109.
4

The Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, § 10, 97 Stat. 1393, 1405 (1983).

5Effron, Supreme Court Review of Decisions by the Court of Military Appeals: The Legislative Background, The Army Lawyer, Jan. 1985, at 61.

6United States v. Goodson, 14 M.J. 542 (A.C.M.R. 1982), affd, 18 M.J. 243 (C.M.A. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S.Ct. 2129 (1985).
7
107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987).
107 S. Ct. at 2931, 2933.
9107 S. Ct. at 2938, 2941 ("The trial of any person before a court-martial encompasses a deliberate decision to withhold procedural protections guaranteed
by the Constitution.") ("[M]embers of the armed forces may be subjected virtually without limit to the vagaries of military control.") (congressional action
required and encouraged) Marshall, J., dissenting.
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